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1. Krugman’s main considerations on crisis and economic recovery 
In his book End This Depression Now! Paul Krugman tries to find some solutions to 
the  lasting  economic  depression,  mirrored  by  a  low  rate  of  growth  and  high  level  of 
unemployment. It is obvious that during the last three years (2010-2012) the economy of the 
most developed countries passed through a disappointing stagnation with a major contribution 
of austerity policies. But Keynes said that austerity had to be applied during the economic 
growth not when the economy was decreasing, and based on this idea Paul Krugman pleads 
for more government spending in order to support private sector and economic recovery. 
Paul Krugman has resumed part of his assessments made in his previous book The 
Return of Depression on Economics and The Crisis of 2008 referring to recent financial and 
economic crisis. He questions Ben Bernanke optimism about economic outlook expressed in 
an interview in March 15, 2009 and afterwards and also his view on so called the economy of 
happiness.  From  USA  to  China  the  most  pressing  matter  is  now  the  high  level  of 
unemployment, and Krugman refers to involuntary unemployment and combats with stupid 
ideas of some American right wing politicians and economists that many unemployed people 
do not want to find jobs. How many unemployed people exist now in USA? Nobody knows 
exactly, the official figure was over 13 million in December 2011, (12.2 million in December 
2012), compared with 7 million in the fall of 2007, but many people have now part time jobs 
and this represents a kind of hidden unemployment. In June 2011 Democracy Corps made a 
survey and found that over 40% of total American families had been affected by the cuts in 
the number of worked hours, salaries level and non-wage benefits. Long term unemployment 
is a painful reality and its social effects are extremely negative, especially when it concerns 
many young and even graduated people. A protracted period of unemployment can badly 
affect for a long time the vocational career and even the life of many young people. 
In 2008 and 2009 the contraction of economy, measured by GDP decrease, was quite 
impressive and the recovery was slow and limited. In USA the estimation of real potential of 
GDP made by the Congressional Budget Office at the beginning of 2012 indicated a deficit of 
7% in the operating potential of American economy, which means a loss of 1000 billion $ per 
year and a total loss of at least 5000 billion $. This huge loss signifies goods, salaries, profits 
not achieved or materialized. For Krugman paying attention mainly to long term perspective 
is a mistake, because short term difficulties, economic and social, will badly impact on long 
term economic development. The loss of investor confidence, the decrease of funds assigned 
for education and health, postponing infrastructure projects will have very negative effects on 
the future economic development. European Union was also seriously disturbed by the crisis 
and now Southern Member States are facing a lot of difficulties caused by the deficits, public 
debts and high unemployment. We may see a certain revival of extremist and nationalist 
movements due to the dissolution of middle class, but their risk is not comparable with that of 
the totalitarian regimes from 20
th century. For Krugman there is a huge human disaster caused 
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by the crisis but there is no excuse for political leaders not to take appropriate  measures  
because we have the necessary knowledge and action tools for solving the economic problems 
and to end the depression as soon as possible. 
After The Great Depression of 30’s Keynes noted that we had enough resources but 
not enough expertise in the field of economics, while nowadays we have even more resources 
and much more knowledge in economics but we have serious deficiencies or troubles in the 
organization and coordination of market economy. Krugman believes that economic morass is 
the result of decades of applying wrong policies and bad ideas, harmful to most people but 
useful for a small minority. Solving the crisis is not easy and also not very difficult because it 
requires intellectual clarification and political will. For Krugman everything revolves around 
demand, the decrease of consumer demand led to output and investment reduction, diminution 
of public expenditures, economic recession. He combats the stupid assertion that general lack 
of  demand  cannot  affect  the  economy  and  gives  a  famous  example  with  the  babysitting 
association in order to draw the following conclusion: your spent money is my income and my 
spent money is your income. If this clear conclusion is ignored and citizens and governments 
spend less, deficits and troubles will occur sooner or later. Less demand means low capacity 
utilization and less income. Now economy is facing coordination failures more than the lack 
of output capacities. Due to the losses recorded during financial crisis many people have 
reduced their demand, they spent less revenue, buy less goods and save more money. The 
amount of credit has been drastically reduced due to the banks attitude and debtors difficult 
position, forced to cut their expenses, as a result incomes and employment collapsed and the 
only solution seemed to be the strong increase of money supply. Since 2008 Fed has tripled 
the money base without any visible effect, that is why a legitimate question looms: can we 
revive the economy with more money? The answer is very simple: we cannot now due the 
liquidity trap. 
Before the financial crisis, US economy had two engines: housing construction and 
consumer expenses based on higher and higher prices of houses, but the breaking of housing 
bubble  led  to  economic  depression.  Fed  tried  to  increase  money  supply  and  reduced  the 
reference interest to almost zero in 2008. We have a liquidity trap when there is enough 
money or liquidity but the demand remains at very low levels due to the fact that there are too 
many debts, less borrowed money, less consumer spending, less confidence of creditors and 
investors. 
There  are  structural  problems  related  to  modern  economy,  produced  by  a  rapid 
increase in labor productivity, but it is not retraining a part of labor force and moving it in 
other sectors the main problem of American economy but the strong demand contraction that 
induced  a  setback  of  private  sector  despite  the  increase  of  money  supply.  After  1937 
depression,  American  economy  revived  during  the  Second  World  War  when  the 
administration had strongly increased its military expenses which fueled a powerful economic 
recovery. For Krugman governmental expenditures  create  consumer demand which is  the 
engine of economic growth. 
Do we have now a new economic thinking or have we returned to the ideas of famous 
past economists like John Maynard Keynes, Irving Fisher or Hyman Minsky? Why is a great 
economist like Minsky, long time marginalized, so important and useful now? Because he 
launched  the  financial  instability  hypothesis  based  on  the  increase  of  indebtedness  for 
supporting investments during the economic stability periods. The accumulation of debts in 
relation to assets and income or the increase of indebtedness finally leads to financial and 
economic crisis. Krugman thinks that making financial debts for investments and growth is a 
good thing, but for a family or a company is not suitable to accumulate high debts which 
make you vulnerable to difficult situations like loss of assets value or sales volume. 189 
 
 
It  was  the  great  American  economist  Irving  Fisher  who  disclosed  in  1933  that  a 
sudden economic decline may lead to a debtor race or panic for hastily paying their debts and 
consequently to a deflation period mirrored by a general decrease of prices and an increase in 
currency purchasing power. More the debtors try to pay more they are indebted. For Krugman 
the difficult situation of world economy is revealed by the fact that the debtors cannot spend 
and the creditors do not want to spend. Within EU highly indebted countries, like Greece, 
Spain, Italy, cannot easily borrow money now due to their difficult financial situation, they 
are  assisted  by  European  Central  Bank  and  other  euro  countries,  like  Germany,  through 
European Stability Mechanism, but they were forced to apply tough austerity programs. But 
austerity measures were enforced also by other EU countries with a low public debt, like 
Romania, or with a relatively strong financial position, like Germany, which may badly affect 
global demand. 
Borrowing money is not a risky activity when there is a boom of economy, although it 
may provoke a future crisis, especially when a break of a speculative bubble appears and the 
high risks of debts blow out. The Minsky moment or Wile E.Coyote moment is the truth 
moment  when  an  economic  collapse  happens  due  to  high  debt  risks  assumed  by  the 
population and economic agents. 
Between 1929 and 1955 the debt of population increased 4 times in US, but due to 
inflation and economic growth its share in GDP had marked decreased. The huge boost of 
private debts between 1929 and 1933, during the Great Depression, points to manifestation of 
deflation by debts when depression and deflation aggravate the debt burden. Krugman blames 
Republican Party policy after 1980 focused on deregulation, liberalization and accumulation 
of huge public debts starting with first Ronald Reagan Administration. 
Is  the  austerity  and  prudent  attitude  based  on  cutting  the  expenses  and  costs  and 
paying  the  debts  the  only  solution  for  remedying  the  difficult  financial  situation  of 
population? Krugman considers that the combination of liquidity trap with prolonged effect of 
excessive  debts  pushed  us  to  fail  on  the  realm  of  paradoxes.  One  of  them  is  the  saving 
paradox, when there is an economic depression saving much more money does not stimulate 
the investments and leads to income contraction and economy restrain. Other two paradoxes 
are: the de-indebtedness paradox revealed by Fisher and the flexibility paradox described by 
Gauti  Eggertsson,  referring  to  the  effect  of  wage  cutting  on  employment.  For  Krugman 
cutting the wages through labor flexibility is a mistake because it leads to income reduction 
while  the  debt  level  remains  the  same.  Someone  needs  to  spend  more  and  borrow  more 
money and this is the state, so Krugman embraces Keynes opinion favoring more government 
expenses for overcoming the economic depression and deems that a certain level of inflation 
will diminish the debt burden and have other positive effects. 
Krugman  blames  Alan  Greenspan  for  misinterpretation  of  the  role  of  financial 
derivatives which led to the reckless lending, huge debts and high credit risks. Due to what 
happened with commercial banks during the Great Depression, new and important legislative 
regulations were adopted in the 30’s, but starting with the 80’s the deregulation process and 
the delay of regulation updating played an evil role in the massive increase of debts and the 
following crisis.  
People who invest money have to choose between liquidity and earnings, but a bank 
provides liquidity for deposits and earnings by giving credits or loans. But a sudden loss of 
trust on behalf of depositors or a panic situation may cause massive withdrawals of deposits, 
strong devaluation of bank assets, bankruptcy of many banks. The ratio between equity and 
raised funds within bank assets had considerably decreased in more than a century, from 20-
20% to around 5% and this explains banks vulnerability to panic situation and creating a 
lender  of  last  resort(central  banks).  US  Congress  adopted  in  1933  Glass-Steagall  Act 190 
 
 
(abrogated in 1999) in order to protect the banks and economy against massive withdrawals, 
also by setting up a public agency to guarantee bank deposits-FDIC, by establishing a system 
of  deposit  insurance  and  by  limiting  banking  activity  to  granting  loans.  The  activity  of 
commercial  banks  was  clearly  separated  from  the  activity  of  investment  banks  and  other 
savings and credit institutions. The deregulation activity which started in some service sectors 
in the 70’s leading to an increased competition and efficiency had stimulated the deregulation 
of banking activity which attracted to taking high risks. A strong increase of loans and risks 
involved in lending activity created great difficulties in many banks. Clinton Administration 
supported the removal of prohibitions separating activities of commercial banks from those of 
investment  banks  which  encouraged  risky  derivative  operations.  In  2007  non-regulating 
parabanking sector surpassed in size the traditional banking sector, but the risks amplified 
and the debts accumulated to a large extent and financial crisis finally erupted. 
In Krugman’s opinion The Big Lie of financial crisis is to blame the US Congress for 
market deregulation and liberalization and not the banks for disastrous lending policy. Poor 
people had benefited from legislative deregulation and from cheap lending but there were 
many assets and markets unrelated to lending to the poor. Most risky credit activities were 
carried out by deregulated private creditors and not by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two 
public agencies involved in the procurement of housing loans. Financial deregulation started 
in 1982 with Garn-St.Germain Act for supporting savings and loans of popular banks but this 
led to a classic case of moral hazard. A lot of credits were granted to real estate developers 
and finally taxpayers had to cover losses amounting to 130 billion $. In the 90’s commercial 
banks  were  facing  serious  difficulties  due  to  huge  loans  offered  to  the  developers  of 
commercial premises. In 1998, when the financial crises haunted in East Asia, the failure of 
an  important  hedging  fund  like  Long  Term  Capital  Management  was  avoided  with  the 
financial assistance of New York Federal Reserve. Financial leaders, like Alan Greenspan, 
praised deregulation excessively, on the ground that it would have led to improved economic 
performance.  Financial  deregulation  had  a  small  contribution  to  economic  growth  and 
household income, but a great contribution to the extraordinary income growth of some few 
people from financial sector. 
The second gold age started after 1980 but only for very few people, like managers of 
hedging funds, investment banks, commercial banks, other financial agents and some few 
personalities close to them. It has been recorded an impressive income increase, but only for 
the top financial elite and their henchmen, representing 0.1% and 0.01% of US population. 
While financial leaders pathetic attempted to justify huge income differences and increasing 
social inequality on the base of higher education, Occupy Wall Street Movement claimed to 
defend the interests of 99% of population. Office for Budget of Congress (OBC) showed in a 
recent report that between 1979 and 2007 the share of the top 1% within the total net income 
increased from 7.7% to 17.1%. Based on Gini index in the same period half of total income 
growth was displaced for the top 1% of population. Very few among the top 0.1% have 
become  enriched  by  creating  valuable  products  or  services,  most  of  them  are  corporate 
managers who set their own salaries which are not tied to management performance. As for 
the managers of hedging funds, investment funds and banks the remuneration packages are 
extremely stimulating regardless of performance achieved, they may engage in very risky 
activities  without  any  liability  or  penalty.  Credulity  of  investors  and  depositors,  lack  of 
regulation and supervision by the authorities, large tax cuts for high incomes are the keys of 
their financial prosperity irrespective of their real contribution to the general welfare. 
Paul Krugman considers the right wing orientation in politics may also explain the 
sudden and massive increase of high incomes, the financial deregulation, the proliferation of 
new financial institutions and financial derivatives. Increasing income inequality could have 191 
 
 
contributed to the accumulation of too many debts by the middle class and to a lower saving 
rate. A lot of money buys more political influence and this explains why politicians were 
blind to  the risks  of  financial deregulation.  Some important  American authors, who have 
analysed the causes and implications of income inequality, are mentioned by Krugman. What 
it is very interesting and was noticed not only by Krugman  is the fact that enough financial 
leaders had become important decision makers in public institutions, took important decisions 
in favor of financial sector and then returned to (other) financial corporations where they 
could  effectively  lobby  politicians.  Krugman  has  quoted  Matthew  Yglesias  opinion  on 
political leaders like those from EU countries who have lost the trust and respect of their own 
people but are valued by Davos Group, IMF, other supernational institutions, like Europeans 
ones, thus being able to get very good jobs in international institutions after leaving the office 
as  a reward for their docility in  applying austerity programs  (maybe  under the unspoken 
slogan: I do not serve my country, I serve only the masters of universe). Krugman defines 
himself as a social liberal and severely criticizes the Republican Party for becoming the party 
of the rich in the last three decades. 
One of the lessons and achievements of Great Depression is macroeconomics, which 
George Lucas jr. believed it could prevent new depressions, assertion that proved to be false, 
especially as many economists have frantically argued for financial deregulation. Krugman 
coined a suggestive expression: a dark age of macroeconomics, possible due to unfortunate 
combination  between  politics  and  theoretical  sociology.  Long  time  Keynes  ideas  were 
repudiated by right wing ideologists and their supporters from universities based on so-called 
similarities between state intervention in the economy and socialism of central planning and 
radical redistribution. In 1943 Michal Kalecki, a socialist thinker, spoke about the blackmail 
with the lack of confidence of economic agents or businessmen in government policy, today 
the same argument is used to fight against any regulation and state intervention. Very wealthy 
people do not accept Keynes ideas mainly on creating jobs by state. State intervention is 
strongly blamed, even monetary policy is rejected by keen conservatives as an effective tool 
to stabilize the economy. While Keynes did not like the idea of leaving financial markets at 
the  mercy  of  speculators,  nowadays  liberal  economists,  like  Eugene  Fama,  University  of 
Chicago, blindly believe in efficient markets hypothesis, although large and rapid fluctuations 
and speculative excesses ought to raise serious doubts on markets rationality.  
Krugman does not put a great value on econometric models that have been highly 
fashionable in recent decades. Theoretical model developed by finance economists, so-called 
Capital  Asset  Pricing  Model,  for  determining  capital  value,  was  used  for  financial 
investments  on  Wall  Street,  for  selecting  securities  portfolio,  to  value  derivatives,  to  get 
Nobel prizes for its creators. Blind faith that modern science of finance economics keeps 
everything  under  control  and  markets  recover  quickly  to  normal  operation  after  any 
depressive relapse is specific to notorious and influential persons like Greenspan and Fama. In 
the 60’s and 70’s the vision of monetarist school, led by Milton Friedman, was rather close to 
Keynes vision on recessions and markets, but meanwhile macroeconomics divided into two 
factions: salty water economists with a Keynesian vision and fresh water economists with an 
ultraliberal vision. Fresh water economists would be the purists of laissez faire philosophy, 
they consider ordinary people as rational human beings and markets as functional, they take 
for true one cannot have situations of general failure of demand and inflation is guilty of 
workers and firms confusion and implicitly of temporary recessions (as Robert Lucas jr. said 
in the 70’s). Long time they questioned the value and utility of Keynesian theory, spreading a 
vision dominated by real business cycle theory which says recessions are a rational, even 
effective, reaction against adverse technological shocks. Neo-keynesian theory, opposed to 
Robert  Lucas  ultraliberal  vision  and  questioning  the  perfect  markets  and  their  perfect 192 
 
 
rationality, was hosted by universities like MIT, Harvard, Princeton and by Fed and IMF. 
Neo-keynesian economists, like Christina Romer and Ben Bernanke, were able to advance 
useful response measures to recent crisis. 
Although Paul Krugman is a great admirer of monetary policy he recognizes the limits 
of monetarist vision of Milton Friedman and the limits of monetary policy effectiveness in 
counteracting economic recessions. Tax incentives and government expenses, supported by 
neo-keynesians,  have  been  rejected  or  hardly  challenged  by  neoliberal  or  monetarist 
economists as potential effective tools in combating recessions. 
Paul Krugman has investigated US Administration response to the recent crisis and 
thinks it was quick but not sufficient, if we take into account the high level of unemployment. 
In US and EU the governments and central banks intervened with cheap money policies and 
bank bailouts, but these actions could not create jobs and reduce unemployment significantly. 
Krugman disapproves Administration timidity on economic recovery measures and the rigid 
and inflexible position of right ideologists, economists, politicians on any state intervention. 
He analyzes the effects of real estate bubble bursting on housing and financial assets prices, 
the impact of Lehman Brother bankruptcy on banking sector, the generous and substantial 
financial assistance offered to banks by Fed and Administration (TARP), the absence of a 
solid recovery and stimulus plan for real economy(only 787 billion $) .Krugman and Stiglitz  
were not wrong criticizing Obama feeble plan because unemployment exceeded 10%, GDP 
growth rate was low, the increase of federal spending share accounted mainly emergency 
assistance given to citizens in need. It seems absurd for Krugman the attempt to save the 
economic system of 45 trillion $ (3 year GDP) with only 787 billion $. Achieving political 
compromise between Democrats and Republicans in US Congress was and still is extremely 
difficult and deterred Obama Administration to offer a greater financial assistance to real 
economy. Krugman advocates for  a direct  reduction of mortgage debts for more than 10 
million Americans and shows the lamentable failure of Administration specific program. For 
him  it  is  obvious  that  political  games  and  intellectual  confusion  would  have  blocked 
economic recovery actions in USA. 
The previous high public and private deficits became even higher during the crisis due 
to bailouts and other programs and led to public expense cuts and to a weak financial support 
for job creation. Krugman believes the lack of jobs is much worse than the burden of high 
deficits which are not an essential issue during an economic depression. The fear of budget 
deficits  is  enhanced by  the fear of any attack from bond vigilantes, investors who sell a 
country’s bonds when they have lost the confidence in its monetary and fiscal policies. But 
for  US  the  costs  for  selling  treasury  bonds  are  very  low  so  the Department  of  the 
Treasury may borrow more money and increase the public debt within a favorable market 
situation. The campaign for cutting the public expenses of debt hawks was based on a future 
and hypothetic raise of borrowing costs which has not materialized, the interest rates being at 
very low levels between 2008 and 2011 when US Administration borrowed more than 5000 
billion $. At the end of 2011 and beginning of 2012 the borrowing costs were at the lowest 
level ever recorded. 
The liquidity trap reveals the large amount of private sector savings, retention of firms 
to invest and the need for government borrowing and spending which expands the aggregate 
demand and consequently leads to absorption of excess of savings supply. The private sector 
savings provided the money for government borrowing in US due to 1000 billion surplus 
recorded  per  year  (the  difference  between  savings  and  investments).  Krugman  sees  no 
competition for getting funds between budget deficits and private sector, as the government 
tries to use the savings surplus of private sector. The difference between short term interest 
rates (controlled by Fed) and long term interest rates (influenced by investors confidence) and 193 
 
 
their impact upon economic recovery explain why both remained very low in the last years. 
Albeit the deficits and debts are very high (as a share in GDP) US do not have any payment 
incapacity risk and it is in a better financial position than Japan and Great  Britain. Euro 
countries like Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and even Greece, with lower public debts, proved 
to be more vulnerable because they do not have their own currencies. 
Krugman deems there is no problem with increasing the level of public debt when 
recording economic growth and inflation. As it was demonstrated the debt must not be paid 
but transferred to future generations, it has a high cost and it will burden the future but any 
fast payment may cause great economic difficulties. Krugman draws the attention upon the 
recklessness to concentrate on short term deficit. Due to liquidity trap a reduction of public 
expenses by 100 billion $ leads to a GDP decrease by at least 150 billion $ which involves a 
weaker economy, less revenues and a net debt cut of no more than 50 billion. When there is 
an economic recession any expense cut is not a good solution for strengthening the fiscal 
position and could harm the future economic recovery. To reduce the real debt value one may 
resort to partially debt canceling or to a higher inflation, or to replace a part of private debt 
with public debt. After Second World War the depression did not return in US because the 
robust economic growth and enhanced inflation had reduced the debt relative to GDP. 
A good part of American right political spectrum, headed by Raul Paul, a proponent of 
Austrian School of Economics, is rather fearful of inflation caused by high deficits, huge bank 
reserves  and  dollar  devaluation    and  blames  Fed’s  hypothetic  inflationary  policies.  But 
between 2009 and 2012 inflation rate did not exceed 2.0% on average and there is only one 
explanation: the liquidity trap. Fed has not printed money but bought financial assets, like 
treasury bonds, and gave loans to commercial banks against transfer of ownership of bonds. 
Fed acquisitions may lead to inflation by credit expansion in a period of economic boom, but 
now we have a prolonged recession. We do not have a stagflation period although energy and 
food  prices  have  strongly  increased  due  to  the  fact  they  haven’t  propagated  to  salaries. 
Consumer  Price  Index  is  used  for  calculating  the  inflation  rate  but  Krugman  brings  into 
question the core inflation, without taking into account food and fuel prices, for measuring 
inflation inertia. Krugman is critical to those who challenge the official figures of US Bureau 
of Labor Statistics supported by MIT (Billion Prices Project) and advance aberrant figures on 
inflation. He thinks we need a higher inflation rate, around 4%, also considering the opinion 
of Olivier Blanchard, IMF chief economist. Firstly a higher inflation will stimulate borrowing 
money and will give more room for maneuvering monetary policy, secondly a higher inflation 
will help in reducing the real value of debts, thirdly the employees accept more easily a higher 
inflation  than  nominal  wage  diminution.  The  wages  have  not  diminished  in  US,  on  the 
contrary they have increased to a certain extent and this explains why there was no deflation 
in US. But we cannot neglect the contribution of food and energy prices and of companies 
policy to cut the costs and not the prices. 
Krugman makes a brief history of European integration and believes that European 
elites have overestimated the single currency gains. But for a country giving up to its own 
currency surely removes the devaluation policy as a means of adjustment to an economic 
shock.  Instead  one  needs  to  cut  the  nominal  wages  to  gain  competitiveness  and  this  is 
extremely  difficult  to  accept  by  employees.  Krugman  insists  on  optimal  currency  area, 
concept introduced by Robert Mundell in 1961 which focused on labor mobility. Comparing 
EU with US one can notice the low labor mobility, lack of fiscal integration, poor economic 
governance. Cheap money policy, pursued by European Central Bank was a great mistake 
since it led to high indebtedness of Southern Member States and to huge housing bubbles. 
Large capital  inflows  fueled speculative bubbles and overgrowth of labor costs, and also 
recording of growing trade deficits within euro area. With the onset of the crisis production 194 
 
 
and employment have dramatically decreased, it swelled bank bailouts, debts burden and cost 
of financing them. For Krugman the Great Illusion of Europe, consists in the wrong belief 
that the sovereign debts crisis was caused in EU by fiscal irresponsibility, which may be true 
only for Greece. Until 2007 the public debt of GIPSI group as a share in GDP has decreased 
constantly, but once the crisis started it has sharply grown up. Although on overall the public 
debt and private debt are smaller than in US, inflation rate is quite low and current account is 
balanced, the situation differs depending on the considered country. For Germany dislikes the 
adjustment through inflation it remains only the solution of deflation for states with financial 
difficulties, hard to attain in the context of wages rigidity. In Iceland the strong devaluation of 
crown led to an important reduction of wages denominated in euro while in Ireland and Spain 
the  wages  have  decreased  only  very  slow  and  to  a  small  extent  with  high  long-term 
unemployment  price.  The  heavy  burden  of  high  debts  may  be  successfully  tackled  only 
through a combination of inflation and rapid economic growth. The single currency has still a 
drawback: some countries are extremely vulnerable to self-validated panic, they are not able 
to refinance their short and medium term debts due to the lack of interest of foreign investors 
or banks for their new issued bonds. EU Member States which have not adopted euro are 
doing better than the single currency countries while new recent members, like Slovenia, pass 
through great difficulties likewise. Saving the euro depends mainly on European Central Bank 
policy,  the  implementation  of  European  Stability  Mechanism,  the  fiscal  and  structural 
adjustment measures of Southern States, IMF financial assistance and access to private capital 
markets. Austerity measures focused on cutting the expenses and increasing the taxes could 
not have good results, on the contrary they emphasize the economic and social decay. 
Much of bankers and financiers decided almost overnight to become the followers of 
austerity measures and in the spring of 2010 OECD recommended to US Administration a 
massive cut of budget deficit and to FED a high growth of short term interest rate, but the 
guidelines were not observed. Not the same thing did Great Britain and European Central 
Bank that had not taken into consideration the extent of unemployment and the consequences 
of  austerity  measures.  Other  institutions,  like  Bank  for  International  Settlements,  and 
influential economists and businessmen have argued in favor of austerity through tightening 
of monetary and fiscal policies. Krugman remarks lack of consistency of the arguments and 
frequent changing of explanations for austeriens. It is obvious that Greece bad example is 
used by the austerity adepts like a fright for imposing an urgent cutting of the deficits and 
debts based on ruined reaction of markets. One cannot deny the high cost of debts (public and 
private) but it is hard to believe or demonstrate with solid arguments that austerity could lead 
to economic expansion. Ireland and Canada are offered as good examples for reducing public 
deficits, but this was achieved during an economic boom as a result of a strong increase of 
fiscal  revenues.  Prime  Minister  of  Great  Britain  David  Cameron  imposed  an  austerity 
program in the field of public expenses but the trust of companies and investors fell to a very 
low level and the economy has remained in a visible stagnation. On February 13, 2013 in a 
desperate attempt to revive the economy, Bank of England started a program for directly 
financing the corporations, including banks, by buying their bonds amounting to 50 billion £. 
When monetary policy is focused on targeting the inflation it is difficult to understand why 
OECD and ECB insisted on interest rate growth. Krugman does not agree with Raghuram 
Rajan from Chicago University who seems convinced that US must undertake deep structural 
reforms for improving supply side and not to revive former demand patterns. Schumpeter, 
Hayek and Rajan are included by Krugman in so-called liquidatorist stream, which considers 
one should not  do anything to  mitigate the consequences  of a depression.  John Maynard 
Keynes had explained why David Ricardo opinion on the fact that an economy may not suffer 
from an inadequate demand, although it is not truthful, has become a sort of axiom. All 195 
 
 
austerity  policies  are  in  favor  of  creditors  (bankers),  while  central  bankers  and  financial 
officials do not like excessive expenses and low interest rates. 
Krugman proclaims his optimistic view on economic recovery, but recognizes that 
reducing income disparities is a difficult task and will take a long time. The optimistic official 
signals  since  2009  proved  to  be  soap  bubbles  as  long  as  the  employment  rate  of  people 
between 25 and 54 year old remained around 75%. In Krugman’s opinion private sector in US 
does  not  want  to  spend enough money for  full  utilization of productive capacity and for 
offering enough jobs to millions of people. Krugman believes the government should take the 
initiative to spend more instead of private sector. More government spending means more 
GDP and more jobs, rising of consumers and companies confidence, funding from central and 
local  level  of  enough  projects  with  spillover  effects.  Krugman  suggests  a  temporary  and 
massive  increase  of  public  spending,  especially  for  financial  aid  given  to  local  and  state 
authorities with the aim to create new jobs, to develop infrastructure projects, to increase 
unemployment benefits. Caught in a liquidity trap at the beginning of 90’s Japan had passed 
through a long stagnation period and in 2000 professor Ben Bernanke criticized Bank of 
Japan  (central  bank)  for  not  taking  appropriate  measures,  like  those  suitable  for  FED: 
increasing money supply for quantitative easing and offsetting the tax cuts, low interest rates 
(under  2.5%)  for  long  term  bonds,  devaluation  of  dollar  by  means  of  central  bank 
interventions, a higher target for inflation rate (3-4%) for a ten year period. As the Chairman 
of Fed, Ben Bernanke has adopted a passive position and not a resolute one, partly because of 
institutional  conservatism  within  Fed  and  partly  due  to  fierce  Republican  opposition. 
Refinancing  or  reducing  mortgage  loans  proved  not  to  be  easy  in  US,  although  Obama 
Administration introduced Home Affordable Refinance Program, which was too cautious and 
too restrictive, while Federal Housing Finance Agency, charged with overseeing of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, had a totally inappropriately activity. Krugman also draws other action 
proposals,  like  a  rougher  attitude  towards  China  in  trade  field,  more  severe  environment 
regulations, policies for creating new jobs, promotion of sustainable development. 
If  US  is  a  center-right  country  one  could  not  accept  major  initiatives  for  new 
government spending, and electoral considerations usually limited any bolder actions in the 
field of economic and social policies. For Krugman the best strategy is the one not approved 
by target  groups researchers or by prestigious  newspapers, like Washington  Post,  but  the 
strategy that brings good results. The quality and efficiency of economic policies depend on 
the color of US  Administration, its  control  on Congress  or what  kind  of majority  exists, 
theoretical  guidance  of  President’s  counselors,  internal  process  of  decision  within  the 
Administration,  lobby  of  interest  groups.  Krugman  is  deeply  convinced  that  economic 
recovery is  impeded by a lack of intellectual clarity and political  will and that increased 
government spending would be critical for economic recovery, the evidence is offered by 
what happened during the wars and arms race. The level of taxes, on which depends the 
government spending, is in inverse proportion with the level of unemployment.  
Krugman is firmly convinced that austerity impedes recovery, the only solution being 
a massive increase of government spending. IMF researchers identified 173 cases of fiscal 
austerity in the developed countries and discovered that after austerity policies there were 
recorded economic contraction and unemployment rise. Krugman cites Stiglitz and Romer as 
theoretical allies in supporting his ideas on fiscal policy role and importance of fiscal stimulus 
in creating new jobs and also on negative effects of budget deficit reduction on economic 
growth.  Unfortunately  according  to  IMF  chief  economist  Olivier  Blanchard  and  IMF 
economist  Daniel  Leigh,  IMF  used  a  mistaken  calculation  coefficient  that  led  to 
underestimation of the negative effects of the crisis. The used multiplier is the coefficient 196 
 
 
linking the evolution of public spending or tax level to economic growth rate which may be in 
times of crisis 3 times higher than that used by IMF. 
 
2. Some conclusions on Krugman’s ideas 
Definitely Paul Krugman is a demand-sider and also very fond of monetary policy, 
albeit he pretends to have a great admiration for Keynes and to be a social-liberal. Though one 
cannot deny the importance of monetary policy within macroeconomic policy one should 
mention that monetary policy is not able to solve any crisis or to prevent a new one when a 
speculative bubble will burst. He is absolutely right considering high unemployment as the 
main problem to be addressed to and to be resolved in US and other countries. The economic 
and social impact of the crisis was very high and was somewhat statistically measured, but 
Krugman talks about a huge human disaster and about the need to rapidly solve the economic 
difficulties and to resume a robust economic growth. It is true that consumer demand is the 
engine of economic growth and its contraction, due to high private debts, loss of revenues and 
jobs, led to economic depression. In US and EU increasing the money supply by the central 
banks could not revive the economy due to liquidity trap (demand is low due to high debts 
and lack of investors and consumers trust). Important past economist like Minsky, Fisher, 
Keynes are mentioned by Krugman for their valuable contributions to analysis of debts impact 
on  crises,  demand,  public  and  private  spending,  while  other  famous  economists,  like 
Schumpeter and Hayek, are considered advocates of non interventionism during the economic 
depressions. 
IMF is excessively and repeatedly praised by Krugman for its interventionist position 
of Keynesian inspiration. Maybe Krugman has not forgotten it was IMF that had imposed 
austerity policies in many emerging and transition economies which had benefited from its 
financial  assistance,  and  the  evil  results  of  such  policies  were  remarked  even  by  IMF 
economists. Perhaps Krugman was disappointed when IMF economists have recently shown 
that IMF overall policy was wrong because it underestimated the negative effects of the crisis 
by using an incorrect fiscal multiplier. I was quite puzzled when I found out there was a study 
entitled ”Growth in a time of debt” published in 2010 by two reputable economists from 
Harvard University, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, former employees of the IMF, 
that was used to justify the austerity policies from USA and EU, which proved to be wrong, 
because it showed that in the countries with a debt of more than 90% of GDP the economic 
growth is negative, when in reality it turned out, three years later, that these countries may 
achieve a growth up to 2.2% per year. I think Kenneth Rogoff is right when he says that the 
huge public debt of USA may affect the whole planet and anyhow represents a real threat for 
the  country’s  capacity  to  face  future  shocks.  Another  contradictory  position  of  IMF 
economists is related to the correlation between fiscal deficit and current account deficit, the 
business cycle model GEM points to no short term effects and very reduced medium term 
effects of fiscal deficit on current account deficit, while the model developed later on by 
Michael Kumhof and Douglas Laxton indicates an instant impact of fiscal deficit.  
In the past decades US and EU economies had three engines: housing sector, foreign 
trade sector and finance sector, the first and the third one facing enormous speculative bubbles 
caused by inflation targeting policy (cheap money), bankers greed and their risky activities 
(derivatives),  financial  deregulation  and  weak  public  supervision.  After  three  decades  of 
economic growth the main beneficiary of impressive income growth was the financial elite, 
representing only 0.1% of population but having a strong political influence. Krugman blames 
huge income differences and increasing social inequality because they were not based on true 
economic performance and a real and consistent contribution to general welfare. On the other 
hand many national political leaders have become the accomplices of financial oligarchy and 197 
 
 
a sort of mercenaries of international and supernational institutions. I could also mention the 
radical opinions of John Perkins who believes that political leaders from USA and probably 
from many other countries and people working within important national and international 
institutions (like World Bank) have become promoters of the interests of large corporations, 
which treat the citizens of developing states as slaves and are only interested in getting huge 
profits derived from the exploitation of their natural resources and cheap labor. For all less 
developed countries entered in the sphere of globalization and to the attention of international 
corporations,  prosperity  is  a  distant  dream  and  only  accessible  by  small  and  privileged 
categories that are very obedient and respond quickly to any foreign demands. 
Krugman  speaks  about  dark  age  of  macroeconomics  due  to  strong  politics  and 
ideology interference into field of economics. Keynes, the father of macroeconomics, was 
contested  by  right  ideologists  and  ultraliberal  economists,  like  Robert  Lucas  jr.,  and 
proliferation of econometric models induced the wrong idea that markets and economy are 
under an effective control. For Krugman salty water economists have a Keynesian vision 
while fresh water economists have an ultraliberal vision, although one can find ultraliberal 
economists also in universities like Harvard and MIT.  
Krugman blames small financial assistance offered by Obama Administration under 
different programs, also its focusing policies on deficits reduction and the excessive anxiety 
of  inflation.  In  EU  cheap  money  policy  of  ECB  and  national  central  banks,  speculative 
housing bubble, speculative capital inflows, persistent trade deficits explain the troubles from 
Euro Zone. Krugman criticizes the austerity measures and reveals the strong vulnerabilities of 
less  competitive  countries  which  adopted  the  single  currency  and  recommends  a  higher 
inflation rate and stimulating economic growth. To exit from liquidity trap Krugman still 
envisages some monetary measures and to encourage economic growth he proposes a massive 
increase of public spending, opinion which is contrary to that of the libertarians challenging 
the efficiency of fiscal stimuli over time as generating a crowding out effect: the government 
spends  funds  that  would  be  allocated  more  effectively  by  the  private  sector,  and  
governmental investments focus too much on GDP quantitative component detrimental to 
qualitative one and to medium/long term productivity of investment programs. But on short 
term  any  quick  economic  recovery  needs  strong  stimuli  from  the  government  given  the 
reluctance  of  private  sector  to  invest  or  to  increase  the  output  in  the  context  of  reduced 
consumer demand. One may discuss on the nature or specificity of these stimuli but I do not 
think  about  their  necessity.  Paul  Krugman  opposes  to  supply  side  policies,  like  those 
suggested  by  Raghuram  Rajan,  although  he  accepts  the  importance  of  financing  targeted 
projects in the field of infrastructure or green energies. As regards the confrontation between 
demand-siders and supply-siders one cannot deny that the implementation of demand side 
policies, through accelerated expansion of credit, led to the financial crisis and there is an 
acute need for a reindustrialization process and also for sectoral policies in sensitive fields, 
such as energy, environment, competition, innovation, which requires significant changes on 
supply side. Maybe Raghuram Rajan is right when he says: “the worst thing the governments 
can do now is to oppose the adjustment, by supporting non-viable companies or by supporting 
through cheap credit the demand for the products of non-viable industries”. 
It is not clear that Krugman wants a tax increase because it seems to me that he does 
not like the classic tax reduction (on profits) proposed by supply-siders like Mundell and 
Lucas. It is obvious that due to the high burden of public debts and its financing costs, the 
public deficits must be reduced to a large extent and the growth of government spending 
cannot be achieved otherwise than through tax increases and/or large domestic and external 
loans. It is easy to criticize the austerity policy but it is difficult to find a viable alternative, 
any fiscal expansion may lead to a deterioration of fiscal deficit and current account deficit, to 198 
 
 
more borrowing and to worsening of public and private debt burden. On the other hand the 
government capability to influence the size of private deficits and debts, and their proper 
solution, remains very limited in the near future.  
Another important source of revenues is represented by the funds raised through a 
complex policy, both at national/European level and at international level, against tax evasion, 
estimated at about 2000 billion euro for EU and at 2000 billion $ for USA . But the main tax 
dodgers are multinational companies and OECD intends to prepare an ambitious action plan 
in  the  first  semester  of  2013  to  reorganize  the  international  norms,  poorly  adapted  to 
globalization and digital economy, that too often allow international corporations to escape 
entirely  from  paying taxes, particularly through transfer pricing policy.  In February 2013 
during G 20 meeting from Moscow, Angel Gurria, Secretary General of the OECD, said that 
during  these  difficult  times  of  budgetary  austerity  the  tax  burden  is  likely  to  fall  on  the 
shoulders of SMEs and on the middle class if multinational companies pay small or no taxes 
at all due to legal subterfuges. Much of the money obtained from tax evasion could be found 
in offshore fiscal heavens where quite recently have been identified a lot of hidden funds, 
amounting to about 32,000 billion $. Another phenomenon is threatening the fragile situation 
of the middle class. At the end of 2012, in USA, corporate profit margins hit an all-time high 
(exceeding  11%  of  GDP  as  against  3%  in  1985)  while  wages  were  at  an  all-time  low 
(descending to 43.5% of GDP as against 53.5% in 1970). The corporate race after short term 
profits at the expense of paying more to the employees badly affects the consumer demand 
and implicitly the future economic growth. A legitimate question arises: if the middle class is 
heavily eroded by the crisis and budgetary austerity, will capitalism remain a truly democratic 
society? 
I may agree with Paul Krugman when he considers the liberalization of capital flows 
may create financial vulnerabilities through sudden exit or entry of capital into a country, but 
I have serious doubts that a large public debt does not have harmful effects on the economy. 
USA may print and use their currency, dollar, to pay or cover any external deficit, and also 
may sell bonds for covering internal deficit to many other countries in the world, it is not the 
case with the other countries. It is obvious we are the witnesses of a fierce confrontation 
between the followers of Keynes and those of the Austrian school of economics. While the 
first ones are in favor of increasing the government expenditures for stimulating the economy, 
the second ones are accepting the essence of business cycle theory developed by Ludwig von 
Mises and Friedrich Hayek: the cheap money policy of central and commercial banks leads to 
unsustainable growth of money supply and to wrong investment decisions of private actors, 
financial  crises  appearing  when  supplying  money  can  no  longer  be  supported,  recessions 
representing the necessary corrections for a more effective reallocation of resources.  
One cannot deny that Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz are right when they conclude 
that austerity policies have led to economic contraction in Southern Europe and to economic 
stagnation within the EU, but is fiscal expansion a viable alternative for euro countries when 
deficits and debts are very high? Any form of fiscal expansion, external or internal financed, 
may  aggravate  the  public  deficit  and  public  debt  and  is  practically  impossible  under  the 
present  financial  circumstances  when  banks,  markets,  investors  and  consumers  lost  their 
confidence  in  the  success  of  economic  reform  measures.  In  my  opinion  the  debates  and 
confrontations on economic policies may continue a long time but it is hard to find quickly 
any realistic solutions for getting out of the current economic situation and resuming a robust 
and sustainable economic growth. Do we face now with a crisis of capitalist system or a crisis 
of growth? Here's a tricky dilemma to be solved in the near future by the great specialists in 
economics, like Paul Krugman.      
 